

# Internet voting and transparency

EVOTE08, Bregenz, Austria

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*Given the current Internet and PC security technology, and the goal of a secure, all-electronic remote voting system, the Federal Voting Assistance Program has taken on an **essentially impossible** task.*

*Security Analysis of the SERVE, January 2004*



# Measures for voters

- Reversible voting
  - Notification of an earlier recorded I-vote
- Testing period
- Verification of the voting application
- Reports:
  - Number of e-voters published online
  - Reports of tabulated and replaced e-votes



# I-voting statistics

	2005 LE	2007 PE
Number of I-votes	9 681	31 064
<i>Changed I-votes %</i>	<i>3,8</i>	<i>2,5</i>
Number of I-voters	9 317	30 275
<i>Replaced with paper-ballot %</i>	<i>0,3</i>	<i>0,1</i>
<b>I-votes counted</b>	<b>9 287</b>	<b>30 243</b>



# Observation

- All electoral activities open for observation
- Tools for observation:
  - Elaboration of the documentation
  - Attending NEC's meetings of system configuration, administration and testing
  - Checking administrative activities against pre-written documentation
  - Attending the counting event





# Calendar of events 07

January 2007																February 2007														March 2007																	
16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	1	2	3	4
<b>Public test voting</b>																		<b>Early voting</b>										<b>Early voting</b>		<b>Election Day</b>																	
																												<b>Internet voting</b>																			
																												Administration		Administration																	
																		Configuration										Configuration																			
																		Audit procedures										Audit procedures		Audit procedures																	



# Audit

## Critical procedures:

- Setup, installation and configuration of servers and applications
- Generating of keys, certificates
- Loading and updating electoral data (candidates, electoral districts, voters lists)
- Transfer of votes
- Transportation of servers
- Printout of the list of i-voters
- Compilation of annulment list, annulment of i-votes
- Counting of votes
- Destroying of votes and other critical information





# Certification

In order to validate the electronic voting system, certification procedures could be established.

If not, other measures like testing and audits of different aspects should be taken.



