



THE CERTIFICATION OF E-VOTING MECHANISMS. FIGHTING AGAINST OPACITY.

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SUMMARY

- I – The industrial certification.
- II – The certification of electronic voting devices.
- III – Who should certify the e-voting machines?
- IV – How should e-voting machines be certified?
Which criteria should we use?
- V – Should the results be disclosed?**



INDUSTRIAL CERTIFICATION

- Mature process.
- Security and quality of industrial products
- Citizen's protection (health, etc.)



E-VOTING CERTIFICATION

- Special features:
 - no external evidences / only illogical results
 - Compensating measures – less citizen control than in paper ballots systems
- Consequence:
 - **It is necessary to set up a specific certification protocol for electronic voting cases.**



OPACITY

- Standard rule = opacity
- Regardless the correct performance of the certification procedure, it is useless from a citizen perspective due to opacity. We are not increasing citizen's control over the e-voting platform.
- Interesting nuances in real practice. The door is not completely closed.



FRANCE

- February 3rd 2006 / The government reject to disclose the certification reports of e-voting machines because this measure could damage:
- “le secret industriel et commercial ... [et] compromettre le bon déroulement des élections”
- “the commercial and industrial secrecy ... [and] endanger the correct electoral management)



INDUSTRIAL SECRECY (I)

- Do the **entire** report **really** compromise industrial and commercial secrecy?
- *There is a list of parameters previously set up by the Government.*
- *Report's format – three columns / check list*
- *Only Yes / No and minor comments*
- *Minor / Major discrepancies with the parameters and a final evaluation accepting or not the system.*
- **NOT DANGER FOR INDUSTRIAL SECRECY, BUT VERY USEFUL FOR CITIZENS**



INDUSTRIAL SECRECY (II)

- **Who** is actually receiving this information?
- *France: ES&S – Disclosure of the the certification report for its main customers (municipalities) / NEDAP – Disclosure of the summary report.*
- *Belgium: Paradoxally political parties are receiving the source code even before the elections, but not the certifications reports*
- *Belgium: The Collège des Experts receives all the documentation.*
- **IS IT REALLY IMPOSSIBLE TO EXTEND THESE TRANSPARENT MEASURES AT LEAST TO A HANDFUL OF OTHER SIGNIFICANT STAKEHOLDERS?**



“LE BON DÉROULEMENT DES ÉLECTIONS”

- **Transparency is the best means to guarantee the security of the elections.**
- “A security scheme whose source code and design is known yet continues to offer a useful level of protection is a good one” [Ki04, p. 65]



**MOLTES GRÀCIES!!
THANK YOU!!**

<http://reniu.blogspot.com>

<http://www.votoelectronico.es>